Abstract. The function decomposition problem can be stated as: Given the algebraic expression of the composition of two mappings, how can we identify the two factors? This problem is believed to be in general intractable 1 . Based on this belief, J. Patarin and L. Goubin designed a new family of candidates for public key cryptography, the so called 2R,schemes" 10, 11 . The public key of a 2R"-scheme is a composition of two quadratic mappings, which is given by n polynomials in n variables over a nite eld K with q elements. In this paper, we contend that a composition of two quadratic mappings can be decomposed in most cases as long as q 4. Our method is based on heuristic arguments rather than rigorous proofs. However, through computer experiments, we h a ve observed its e ectiveness when applied to the example scheme D "given in 10 .
Introduction
Public key cryptography is becoming more and more important in modern computer and communication systems. Many public key cryptosystems PKCs have been proposed since Di e and Hellman initiated this direction in 1976 2 . Usually the security o f a P K C relies on a hard mathematical problem. The most famous such problems are integer factorization and discrete logarithm. PKCs based on these two kinds of problems, such as RSA 13 and ElGamal 3 , although mathematically sound, need to perform a large amount o f h uge arithmetics, so are not very e cient compared to classical symmetric cryptographic algorithms such as DES. Much e ort has been paid in seeking more e cient constructions for PKCs. One class of these constructions make use of mapping compositions. The basic idea is as follows: a user chooses several easily-invertible mappings which h e k eeps secret, computes the algebraic expression of their composition and makes it public; then anyone else can do encryption or verify signatures using the public key, but will be faced with a set of complicated algebraic equations when he tries to decrypt cipher texts or to forge signatures. An obvious advantage of these PKCs is that the private key side computations decrypting and signing can be made very e cient and be implemented with very simple hardware. There are two main drawbacks however: large public key size and ambiguous security foundations.
The earliest examples of PKCs making use of mapping compositions were proposed by T.Matsumoto and H.Imai 4 in 1985. One of them, called B", looks like t f s", where t; s are two secret linear mappings over GF2 n , f : x 7 ! x+c m o d 2 n ,1+1; 0 7 ! 0, c is also secret, and elements of GF2 n is identi ed with integers naturally. This scheme is still unbroken. Another example is called C " see also 5 , in which the above f is replaced by a quadratic polynomial tuple" which will be called quadratic mapping in this paper. C was broken by Jacques Patarin 7 in 1995.
One-round schemes are generalizations of C . They are of the form the t f s", where s; t : K n ! K n are a ne, f : K n ! K n is quadratic, and K is a nite eld. J. Patarin and L. Goubin gave several constructions of one-round schemes using algebraic techniques and S-boxes see 10,11 , and they also showed that their constructions are insecure. Therefore they proposed two-rounds schemes, abbreviated as 2R", in which the public key is the composition of two secret oneround schemes, based on the assumption that functional decomposition problem is hard.
In this paper, we show that 2R" schemes can be decomposed into separated one-round schemes in most cases as long as the eld K has more than 4 elements. However, we w ere only able to justify this claim by some heuristic arguments and experimental evidences instead of rigorous proofs.
Brie y stated, our method is as follows. Suppose = f g : K n ! K n be the composition of two quadratic mappings. We h a ve n output polynomials of in n variables of degree 4. The partial derivatives of all these polynomials with respect to all the n input variables give n 2 cubic polynomials, spanning a linear spaceṼ . This space is contained in the space V of cubic polynomials spanned by products of the n input variables X i and the n intermediate output polynomials of g, provided that K has more than 4 elements. Since bothṼ and V tend to have dimension n 2 for random choices, we hope they are equal or at least the the codimension is small. For a linear combination F of input variables, we can use linear algebra to compute V : F , the space of quadratic polynomials r such that rF 2 V . When n 2, the intersection of these spaces is a candidate for the space Lg spanned by the n output polynomials o f g. This last statement needs the assumption that the factorization of is unique, that is, if we write = f 0 g 0 for quadratic f 0 ; g 0 , then g and g 0 di er only by a linear factor. We h a ve applied this method to a concrete example D in the 2R" family. D is a composition of two D s, and a D is a mapping of the form t s", where is the squaring in the extension eld K n . In the example, K = GF251 and n = 9. In our experiments, the above method has never failed to nd the linear class of the inner D , b y which w e mean the set of mappings which di er from each other by a linear bijection.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 gives a brief review of 2R" schemes and some notations and de nitions. Section 3 describes the steps in decomposing compositions of quadratic mappings. Section 4 gives some experiment reports. Section 5 is the conclusion of this paper.
2 2R" Schemes and D ": A Brief Review Through out this paper K denotes a nite eld of q elements, and K n denotes the vector space over K of dimension n. A n y polynomial P = P X 1 ; X 2 ; ; X n can be seen as a mapping K n ! K : x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n 7 ! P x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n . Similarly, any n polynomials P 1 ; P 2 ; ; P n can be regarded as a mapping K n ! K n : x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n 7 ! P 1 x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n ; P 2 x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n ; ; P n x 1 ; x 2 ; ; x n :
Conversely, a n y mapping K 2R" schemes 2R" stands for 2 rounds were introduced by Jacques Patarin and Louis Goubin in 11 . The private key consists of 1. Three a ne bijections r; s ; t from K n to K n .
2. Two quadratic mappings ; : K n ! K n in fact, these two mappings can also be made public. The public items are:
1. The eld K and dimension n. 2. The n polynomials of the composed mapping = t s r which are of total degree 4. The public-key side computation is just an application of the mapping both message blocks and signatures belong to K n . To explain decryption and signing, we need more words. The designers of these schemes do not require the private mappings ; be bijections. To a c hieve the uniqueness of decryption, we should introduce enough redundancy in message blocks. Similarly, to compute a signature, we should keep enough redundancy-bits so that for any message m, we can nd a redundant tail R making mjjR lie in the range of . The noninjectiveness of ; will in general greatly reduce the e ciency in private-key side computations. In the scheme D , these drawbacks are overcomed by a clever choice of the message-block space, see 10 . The essence of decryption is to nd the full preimage ,1 c for any given c, and that of signing is to nd a single element belonging to ,1 c. When the private keys are known, this can be reduced to inverting and .
As the authors of 11 point out, the security of 2R" schemes can be a ected by the choices of ; . Since and should be easy to construct and invert, currently only the following constructions are known:
1. C -functions": monomials o ver an extension of degree n over K: a 7 ! a 1+q .
2. Triangular-functions": a 1 ; ; a n 7 ! a 1 ; a 2 + q 1 a 1 ; ; a n + q n,1 a 1 ; ; a n,1 where each q i is quadratic.
3. S-boxes-functions": a 1 ; ; a n 7 ! S 1 a 1 ; a n1 ; S 2 a n1+1 ; ; a n1+n2 ; ; S d a n1++nd,1 ; ; a n where n = P n i , and S i is a quadratic mapping K ni ! K ni .
4. techniques by combining S-boxes" with triangular-functions". 5. D -functions: squaring in extension of K of degree n, denoted as K n , where q n , 1 mod 4.
Previous researches 11,8 have shown that, when is in the rst two classes, the resulted scheme is weak. Note that if we drop t and in above description of 2R", we get the so called one-round schemes. A 2R" scheme is just a composition of two one-round schemes. All one-round schemes from the above constructions have been shown to be insecure 8,9,7,10,11 .
D " is a special instance of 2R". It is de ned as:
1. q n , 1 mod 4, and q is about of the size 2 8 . F or example, q = 251, n = 9 10 . 2. r; s ; t are linear bijections. 3. = is the squaring in K n , where K n denotes the extension of K of degree n. 4. The message block space is chosen in such a w ay 10 that the restriction of on it is an injection. This is irrelevant to the purpose of this paper. Note that the public polynomials i n D are all homogeneous of degree 4.
3 Decomposing 2R" Schemes A basic assumption behind 2R" schemes is that the functional decomposition problem for a composition of two quadratic mappings from K n to K n is hard. In this section we will give evidences which indicate that this assumption is not realistic provided q 4.
As in the previous section, let = t s r be the public key. If for any quadratic f;g, satisfying = f g, w e h a ve f = t s 1 , g = s 2 r, for some a ne bijections s 1 ; s 2 satisfying s = s 1 s 2 , w e s a y that has unique factorization. If the factorization of is not unique, even we can decompose it into two quadratic mappings, we are not sure if these two mappings are oneround functions which can be attacked by known methods. Therefore we need to assume this uniqueness of decomposition. It seems di cult to justify this assumption theoretically, but we believe that most compositions of quadratic mappings do have unique factorizations.
Note that if we can nd a g = s 2 r, then f may be obtained by solving linear equations arising from coe cients-comparing. Note also that s 2 is not important, what we really care is the a ne class fs r : for all a ne bijection sg similarly, the linear class of a mapping g is fs g : for all linear bijection sg, and this class is uniquely determined by the vector space generated by component polynomials of g and 1. In the following we will describe how to obtain this space when given the component polynomials of .
To ease the discussion, we assume all the mappings r; s ; t ; ; are homogeneous. In this case, we only need q 3. The general case can be reduced to the homogeneous case when q 4, by a standard algebraic procedure which i s called homogenization, see Appendix 1.
A Linear-Algebra Problem on Polynomials
Now w e assume f;g be two homogeneous quadratic mappings from K n to K n . Given the composition f g, which is a homogeneous mapping of degree 4, we want to determine the linear class of g, this is equivalent to determine the linear space Lg generated by component polynomials o f g. This linear space may not be directly obtained, but later we will show that the linear space V g = P 1in X i Lg can in most cases be obtained from the component polynomials of f g. S o w e are faced with the following problem of linear algebra.
Problem 1 Let W be a linear space of dimension n consisting of quadratic forms in n variables X 1 ; ; X n . Given V = P 1in X i W, i s i t p ossible and how to uniquely determine W?
For any subspace L 0 of the linear space L generated by X 1 ; ; X n , let V : L 0 = def = fr 2 K X 1 ; X 2 ; ; X n : rL 0 V g: When L 0 has dimension 1, say, generated by F, w e also write V : F = V : L 0 .
We h a ve the following conjecture.
Conjecture 1 Notations and assumptions as above, then for randomly chosen W, the probability that V : L = W are very close to 1 when n 2. Note that V : L 0 can be computed using linear algebra for any V and L 0 , s o the above conjecture says that in general the answer to the above problem is positive.
Although we can not prove the above conjecture or give a reasonable estimation on , in the following we will justify this conjecture with some heuristic arguments based on some standard facts from linear algebra.
Let Q denote the total space of all quadratic forms. We h a ve dimQ = nn+ 1=2. In the application at hand we m a y assume dimW = n, s o d i m Q=W = nn + 1 =2 , n = nn , 1=2, where Q=W means quotient space. Now w e wish to estimate dimV : L=W. Note that V : L=W = i V : X i =W. I t i s n o t easy to characterize this intersection because of the complex relations between the spaces V : X i . To simplify things, we regard the n spaces V : X i =W as n independent random variables. This is neither supported or disapproved by a n y theoretical results we know. By linear algebra see Appendix 2, two random subspaces of dimension n 1 ; n 2 of a n-dimension space tend to have intersection of dimension n 1 + n 2 , n, s o w e need that P i dimV : X i =W exceeds n , 1nn , 1=2 to expect a nonzero intersection i V : X i =W. Now let us see the dimension of the subspaces V : X i =W. Since every coordinate X i plays the same role, we only need to consider V : X 1 =W. Let g 1 ; g 2 ; ; g n be a basis of W, a n y element i n V : X 1 =W can be written in form P g i F i =X 1 , where F i are linear forms in X 2 ; ; X n , and satisfying P g i 0; X 2 ; ; X n F i = 0 . L e t be the linear map from L 0n , where L 0 be the space of linear forms in X 2 ; X n , to the space of cubic polynomials: F 1 ; ; F n 7 ! X g i 0; X 2 ; ; X n F i :
Then we see dimV : X 1 =W dimker . Again we regard as a random linear mapping between spaces of dimensions nn,1; n, 1nn + 1 =6 respectively, s o w e m a y expect dim = nn,1,n,1nn+1=6 dimker = 0 , if the r.h.s is negative. This number is: 2, when n = 3 ; 4; and 0, when n 5. Therefore we can not expect P i dimV : X i =W n,1nn,1=2 when n 3, which suggests we h a ve good chance to have V : L = W. Note that this conclusion would be more credible if q or n gets larger.
Recovering V g
In the previous section we h a ve indicated that f g can likely be factored as long as V g can be obtained. Now w e will show h o w to get V g from the component polynomials, h 1 ; ; h n , o f f g.
LetṼ denote the linear space generated by @h j @X i 2 V g; for all i; j:
Proof. When q 3, the expression for each h j as a homogeneous polynomial of degree 4 is unique. We can write h j in form P a k;l g k g l , s o w e h a ve
u t Since dimV g n 2 , i f w e regard the n 2 partial derivatives as random vectors in V g, then with probability greater than Q i 0 1,q ,i , which is close to 1 , 1=q when q is not too small, we will haveṼ = V g. In general, the probability that dimV g=Ṽ is approximately q , 2 . So whenṼ 6 = V g, we can expect that dimV g=Ṽ b e v ery small, say n . WhenṼ 6 = V g, V g m a y be recovered fromṼ as follows. Randomly choose a subspace L 0 of L and compute Ṽ : L 0 , if we can be assured that Ṽ : L 0 Lg, then we can add Ṽ : L 0 L toṼ , and hope this will enlargeṼ and by repeating the process to nally getṼ = V g. The problem is that it is hard to decide whether Ṽ : L 0 L g. In the following we will give a solution to this problem for n 4.
Assume 0 = dimV g=Ṽ n and n 4. By arguments in the previous subsection, we h a ve seen that V g : F = Lg holds with high probability for a randomly-chosen linear form F . On the other hand, dimFLg Ṽ n, , and the equality also holds with high probability. V g : F = Lg implies that Ṽ : F = FLg Ṽ =F:
So we could expect that dimṼ : F = n , occur frequently. Moreover can be detected from the fact that = n , minfdimṼ : F : for su ciently many random Fg . N o w it is easy to conclude that Ṽ : F L g for those F satisfying dimṼ : F = n , .
An Example
In this section, the methods of the previous section are applied to a concrete example, D with q = 251; n = 9, which is suggested in 10 . The irreducible polynomial for de nition of K 9 is chosen as t 9 + t + 8the choice is irrelevant to the analysis of the scheme. Let denote the squaring in K by the heuristic arguments in the previous section, we m a y assume g = . The component polynomials o f is given in appendix, where indexes for variables start with 0. It can be veri ed that dimV g = n 2 = 81. We did not nd any linear form F, such that V g : F 6 = Lg, among 1000 randomly chosen F. S o Lg has much stronger properties than that stated in Conjecture 1. This also suggests that, if the inner factor of a 2R" scheme is a one-round scheme of type D , the attack described in the previous section would likely be successful.
We h a ve also done experiments to verify that, the linear space V g can indeed be recovered by the method described in previous section. For = t s r, de neṼ to be the linear space generated by partial derivatives of component polynomials of . It is easy to prove that dimṼ does not depend on t and r. S o w e let t = r = 1. Again we h a ve tried 1000 randomly chosen s, and we always get dimṼ = n 2 = 81. The programs see Appendix 3 for these experiments are written in Mathematica 3.0, where test1" tests the properties related to Conjecture 1, and test2" test the distribution of dimṼ .
Conclusion
In this paper, we h a ve showed that the functional decomposition problem for compositions of quadratic mappings is not hard provided the eld of coe cients has more than 4 elements. As a consequence, the base eld for 2R" schemes has only 3 choices: GF2; G F 3; G F 4. However, in these cases, the dimension n should be large to guarantee a reasonable block size say, 64 bits; since the public key size is at the order of n 5 , one can easily see that the resulted schemes are simply impractical. This concludes that the idea of 2R" schemes is not interesting. One possible cure is to replace a few of the component polynomials with random polynomials before composing the last a ne bijection, using ideas in 12 . Again, this will greatly reduce the e ciency of private-key side computations, hence lower the practical value of the original designs.
It remains open if the corresponding functional decomposition problem is really hard when q 4. ;f 1 ; ;f n .
Conversely, for anyf of this form, de ne its dehomogenization to be f = f 1 1; X 1 ; ; X n ; ;f n 1; X 1 ; ; X n . Lemma 2. Let the f;g be two mappings K n ! K n . I f q degf degg, theñ f g =f g.
Proof. In this case, composition of mappings is equivalent to composition of polynomials, and the lemma follows from the fact that homogenization commutes with polynomial composition.
u t
Suppose we are given a 2R" public key , i f w e can decompose =f g, then the decomposition = f g can be obtained simply by dehomogenization. The above lemma guarantees the existence of such a decomposition of. I n decomposing using the method of this paper, we should add the n polynomials X 3. The probability that the intersection of two random subspaces of dimension n 1 ; n 2 in a space of dimension n has dimension n 1 + n 2 , n + 0 0 is n , n 2 , ; 2n , n 1 , n 2 , n , n 1 , ; 2n , n 1 , n 2 , n 1 + n 2 , n + ; n n 1 ; n ,1 n 2 ; n ,1 q , n1+n2,n+ 4. The probability that a random linear mapping : K n1 ! K n2 h a s a k ernel of dimension e = maxn 1 , n 2 ; 0 + 0 is q ,n1n2 e; n 1 n 1 , e; n 2 Table Coefficient f,x i x j x k , i,0,n-1 , j,i,n-1 , k,j,n-1 ; test2 count_ :=Block A, f, n0, n1, n2, i, S,r,h , i=1; n0=n1=n2=0; While i =count, A=Table Random Integer,p-1 , k,n , j,n ; f=phi.A ; g=Expand f, Modulus-p ; S= ; h=Expand psi .Table y j -g j+1 , j,0,n-1 , Modulus-p ; Do AppendTo S, tovector3 d h k , j , k,n , j,n ; r=n^2-nn+1n+2 6+Length NullSpace S, Modulus-p ; Switch r, 0, n0++, 1, n1++, 2, n2++ ; i++ ; Print n0 ; Print n1 ; Print n2 ; ;
